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VBarbara Jane Davy recently completed her Ph.D. at Concordia University, 
Montreal, and currently serves as President of the Environmental Studies 
Association of Canada.  Her research interests include Levinasian and 
environmental ethics, and nature religion. ccording to Emmanuel Levinas, ethics arise in the face of the other; as 
he other calls out to oneself, one is obligated to the other. To extend 
his beyond Levinas’ focus on the interhuman, one needs a sense of 
thics that does not ask who can make such calls before feeling 
bligated. Building on Levinas’ ethical alternative to egoistic 
ubjectivity, “the one for the other” as oneself responsible to the other 
uman, I develop a form of ethical subjectivity responsible not only to 
uman others, but to all others in the more than human world.1 I call 
his form of ethical subjectivity “being with/in.” Like Levinas’ “the one 
or the other,” being with/in provides an alternative to Cartesian 
ubjectivity and the fragmented subjectivities of postmodern thought. 
eing with/in addresses the questions of “what does it mean to be a 
uman self in a more than human world?” and “who is this ‘our’ in 
what are our obligations to the others?’” It explores what it means to 
e a person in relation, to be with/in the more than human world 
onsidering postmodern and environmentalist thought. Like Levinas, 
y answers to these questions are given in the first person: I am 
bligated, “me.” 
or those influenced by Levinas, and indirectly by his work through 
errida and his followers, an adequate ethic cannot be based in a 
artesian paradigm of subjects and objects; it cannot be objective or 
ubjective. However, nor is a fragmented sense of self adequate for 
thics. An adequate postmodern environmental ethic requires a 
ethinking of ontology and epistemology, thinking prior to the 
eparation of self and world, subject and object, that preserves or 
ebuilds a sense of self as ethical subjectivity oriented by the others. 
esponding to, and tacking across, current streams in postmodern 
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thought, I posit a post-Cartesian theory of interpersonal relations and 
ethics, wherein the self is understood as an embodied participant 
embedded in the world, interdependent with others, where others are 
understood to include nonhuman others. Oneself, in this system, 
recognizes the interpenetration and overlap of categories, including self 
and other, and human and nonhuman persons, so that one perceives 
oneself as being with/in a continuum of beings, responsible to all 
others. 
Being at Home with Itself 
Being chez soi, usually translated as being at home with itself, is 
Levinas’ term for unethical subjectivity. It describes the self as a 
unitary self-enclosed ego, separate from others, enjoying and using 
objects, totalizing them into one’s own world. Being at home with itself 
is the self, or human subject, understood as one’s own domain, the self 
as sovereign. Levinas uses the image of being at home with oneself to 
illustrate how the self egoistically relates to the world. Through the 
home, one establishes a relation with the world as possession, drawing 
things into oneself, one’s own world.2 Having a home is the condition 
of possession, of having oneself as a self, but also having things, 
bringing things to mind, as well as bringing things physically into one’s 
own possession.3 Having a home puts the world at one’s disposal.4
Levinas’ writings about being at home with itself appear to be directed 
at the privileged position of one who is able to dominate others and the 
environment. But his criticisms of being at home with itself are self-
directed—it is always “me” who is obligated to the other. His analysis 
of being at home with itself is directed at what he sees as a universal 
tendency toward egoism, the urge toward totality, to possession. His 
ethics do not sanction any rationalization based on one’s social position, 
or arguments about oneself being more deserving for having suffered 
oppression. Justice, rather than ethics, in his view, involves hearing 
such claims. Levinas distinguishes between ethics and justice: ethics 
come to pass in relations between oneself and a single other, making an 
infinite demand on oneself regardless of social position, while justice 
involves the balancing of conflicting claims between oneself and 
multiple others.5
According to Levinas, being at home with itself is the self as naturally 
concerned with itself, but also corresponds to the philosophic 
understanding of the self,6 culminating in the Cartesian subject. Being 
at home with itself is subjectivity identified with itself, “the same,” the 
unified “I think.”7 Levinas criticizes being at home with itself for being 
deaf to others, wrapped up in itself, naturally egoistic, totalizing others 
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into it’s own concerns. He identifies this with human subjectivity in 
general, but also links it to the philosophic notion of the subject. 
In being at home with itself, the self does not extend beyond itself to 
encounter the other. The self in this state sees others only in terms of I-
It relations,8 or as he and she in the third person, never meeting the 
other face to face.9 The self as being at home with itself knows the 
world by bringing things to mind, by drawing otherness into itself, 
totalizing. The self “appropriates and grasps the otherness of the 
known,”10 rather than meets the other face to face. It recognizes only 
itself, experiencing everything in its own light, through a totalizing 
reason. It cannot hear, or otherwise perceive, others face to face. The 
self cannot truly encounter others in this state.11
While Levinas rejects the Cartesian notion of the self and the language 
of ontology (of subjects, and of being) in his criticism of being at home 
with itself, he still accepts the possibility of authentic selves, or at least 
the possibility of authentic relations with others. When asked about “the 
disappearance, or the demise, of the subject” discussed in postmodern 
philosophy, Levinas replies that he rejects the model of the self of 
ontology, in favour of a “meontological version of subjectivity . . . 
Ethical subjectivity.”12 For Levinas, “having” a self is not ethical, yet a 
self is necessary for ethics. As Levinas says, oneself is called upon as 
“me” in face-to-face relations. Who is responsible if not oneself? A self, 
some form of subjectivity, is necessary for responsibility and ethical 
action. 
Subjectivity remains necessary also for mental health and the capacity 
to interact with others in community. Jane Flax raises an important 
point about the necessity of having a sense of what she calls a “core 
self,” for one’s mental health, and for participating in meaningful 
relationships, both in terms of parenting and participation in political 
movements. From her work with people suffering from borderline 
syndrome, she concludes that, without a sense of core self, the 
experience of the self as fragmented or decentred is felt as “a terrifying 
slide into psychosis,” where common sensations of pleasure and 
interactions with the world “are simply not possible”. 13
The One for the Other 
In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1998), Levinas develops 
an ethical alternative to being at home with itself, as “the one for the 
other,” oneself responsible to, and for, the other. This form of 
subjectivity is not constituted by a Cartesian subject, but is oneself, 
“me,” responsible to the other. The one for the other is the one who 
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says “me voici,” or “here I am,” rather than conceiving of itself as the “I 
think.”14
The one for the other is an ethical subjectivity that is not fragmented but 
torn open, exposed to the other. The other interrupts being at home with 
itself, tearing one out of one’s own concern for itself. The one for the 
other is subjectivity in exile from being at home with itself, 
denucleated. For Levinas, in ethics the self is not fragmented into 
incoherence, but interrupted, and reoriented, by the other. Levinas’ 
understanding of subjectivity “grounds” itself in ethics, oriented toward 
the other, whereas fragmented models have not found any new centre or 
organizing principle. 
For Levinas’ understanding of ethical subjectivity, the experience of 
being at home with itself is formative. In my life, the fragmentation 
resultant from the collapse of faith in the subject and in God has shaped 
my understanding of ethical subjectivity. For a long time, I could not 
see how it might be possible to hold oneself together ethically, or how 
to regain a sense of orientation. Cartesian subjectivity was inadequate, 
but I could not find a more satisfactory language of subjectivity, or way 
of narrating my life in a meaningful way. Levinas’ work gives a 
different means of orienting myself and suggests an alternative means 
of describing my relations with others in a way that ethically makes 
sense after postmodern fragmentation. 
Being Lost 
As Nietzsche has said, “Extreme positions are not succeeded by 
moderate ones but by extreme positions of the opposite kind. . . . One 
interpretation has collapsed; but because it was considered the 
interpretation it now seems as if there were no meaning at all in 
existence.”15 Like the death of God, the demise of the subject has been 
felt in philosophy as a decentring and disorienting experience of 
nihilism. Levinas recognizes this as a nostalgia for totality, saying that 
in “the whole trend of Western philosophy culminating in the 
philosophy of Hegel . . .. One can see this nostalgia for totality . . .. It is 
as if the totality had been lost, and that this loss were the sin of the 
mind.”16  
Nietzsche describes the nihilism of the early stages of postmodern 
thought in terms of disillusion and dissolution: “Are we not plunging 
continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there 
still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite 
nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become 
colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? . . . God is dead.”17 To 
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fragment and fall apart is a first response to the loss of the totalizing 
vision of being at home with itself. 
But Nietzsche also provides a clue to a way out: “We have left the land 
and have embarked. We have burned our bridges behind us. Now little 
ship, look out! Beside you is the ocean.”18 Nietzsche has a boat. But 
how does he navigate? How is one to plot a course without a foundation 
or overarching structure, without a God transcendent of the natural 
world, without reference to a suprasensory realm? Nietzsche’s little 
ship is blown around by the wind, rather than propelling himself in a 
chosen direction. In losing his foundation, he loses a foundation for 
ethics, as does Western philosophy in general. Levinas, however, does 
not lose his sense of God or transcendence, but nor does he continue to 
base his ethics in a foundational philosophy. Levinas’ understanding of 
oneself as ethical subjectivity is decentred, but is not without 
orientation. I am sympathetic to Nietzsche’s sense of being lost without 
the secure foundations of religious faith, but the orientation on the other 
that Levinas develops does not require this foundation.19
Restructuring Oneself 
One still needs a sense of self after postmodern critiques of the subject, 
and a fragmented self will not suffice. After experiencing 
fragmentation, one can tack together the fragments, and build oneself 
anew in ethical subjectivity. We need some structure to build a self (we 
need a “core,” as Flax says), but it need not be a “house,” as implied in 
Levinas’ image of being at home with itself. One needs a place to be, 
but it need not be exclusively one’s own. One can range about a 
territory and be at home, without owning one’s home as a domain. 
Perhaps, then, instead of trying to avoid rebuilding the master’s house 
by using the master’s tools, we should try making something else, 
looking not to build a new house but another sort of structure, 
something mobile, manoeuvrable, suited to the terrain in which we find 
ourselves. For me this is a canoe. 
A canoe is a small watercraft, usually a bit bigger than twice as long as 
an adult human is tall, tapered at both ends, and propelled by paddle. 
Canoes do not have closed decks, but are instead open on top, held open 
by thwarts. This structure is not a shelter, or at least not a good one. In 
the rain, I can crawl under my canoe, but it does little to shelter me: this 
is not what it is designed for. A canoe is a means of transport, more like 
a verb than a noun. 
While a ship has a home port, a canoe has a home territory: not a place 
to call one’s own, but where one belongs (belongs to the land instead of 
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vice versa). Canoes do not need safe harbours, but can be pulled up on 
almost any shore. Unlike a ship, one does not pilot a canoe. To paddle a 
canoe, if paddling solo, one sits not in the centre, but in the stern, a bit 
off to one side so the canoe is angled in the water. (Canoes can hold 
more than one person, like I hope to, in having children. Also, I share 
my canoe with my spouse, but it is still my canoe.) A canoe does not 
drown out the sounds of others like a motorboat does, nor does it 
pollute the water with gas and oil. In a canoe, one travels through the 
land. Kneeling in a canoe at water level, one can be with/in the land, 
rather than the centre of a totalizing gaze of the world as one’s own. 
Travelling by canoe, my ability to appropriate things for myself (as in 
being at home with itself) is restricted, because I need to be able to 
portage: I am limited by how much I can carry, including gear and the 
canoe. The canoe is designed not only to carry me, but for me to carry 
it. 
A canoe does not need to be elaborate. It can be built with the materials 
one finds locally, in areas in which canoes are an appropriate means of 
travel. My great uncle built his first canoe with a handsaw. (He said it 
looked like “a sick horse with its ribs sticking out,” but it was 
functional.) A canoe can be made as a dugout, or it can be built using 
birch bark and black spruce roots, or skins and driftwood. I am building 
a cedar strip canoe, following the techniques developed through trial 
and error by my great uncle. I am using lumber and tools that my great 
uncle left to my father when he passed on, and I am doing this with the 
help of my father’s knowledge of his canoe building techniques. 
First we cut and shaped ribs out white ash, to give the canoe strength. 
The gunwales are also white ash, strong enough to give the canoe 
structure, and, when boiled, flexible enough to be shaped. The keel, 
also white ash, will lend the canoe stability and manoeuvrability in the 
water. Strips of white cedar are glued over the ribs, to give the canoe its 
flexible outer form. Over this goes the waterproofing skin of the hull. 
This gives the canoe protection, but it is the most vulnerable to damage 
of all parts of the canoe, like healthy ego boundaries. 
A canoe is a well-suited craft for the land in which I grew up, the 
Canadian Shield. The waters of this land are not necessarily symbolic 
of the dissolution and the disillusion of Nietzsche’s little ship tossed on 
the sea. Water is not only a symbol, and although the oceans have their 
appeal, I would prefer to stick to the interlacing rivers, lakes, and 
streams of the land with which I am most familiar, within the Ottawa 
Valley. James Raffan suggests that, “By virtue of having three oceans 
fed by rivers and lakes throughout the country, Canada is also a land of 
canoes . . . And for each river, each waterway, there is a people or 
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layers of people through time who are bound to the land and to the 
water by a canoe.”20 Raffan is correct insofar as saying that this is true 
of “the wilderness fantasy that is Canada.”21 It expresses a prominent 
myth of Canadian identity, but it is not true to all regions or peoples of 
Canada. While a canoe may be “the most appropriate vehicle for 
travelling the greater part of this boreal country,”22 not all of Canada is 
boreal. Kayaks are better suited to the waters of the Arctic Ocean, and 
neither a canoe nor a kayak is much use in the midst of the prairies. I 
draw attention to this because I do not intend that this canoe narrative of 
subjectivity be totalizing, or all encompassing. As William C. James 
cautions, “Perhaps as Canadians we are never more nostalgic, never 
more atavistic, than when we get into a canoe. But it is well to be 
cautious before uncritically rhapsodizing about the transformative 
possibilities inherent in canoe trips seen as mythic quests. The canoe 
has no magical properties.”23
Canoes can take advantage of variable winds to move across streams, 
changing tacks, but can also paddle against the wind or current when 
necessary, like when ethics require going against the mainstream. But 
perhaps I am getting carried away with myself in developing this canoe 
metaphor. Are we all in the same boat? In the sense conveyed by Haida 
artist Bill Reid’s The Spirit of Haida Gwaii, we are all in the same boat 
when it comes to “the environment” in general. We are all in the same 
boat in the sense that we all, different groups of humans and other 
species, share this planet. All waters flow into the sea, and all are 
connected, but they are not the same, and the crafts we use to navigate 
the waters are not all the same, nor should they be. Navigation and 
crafts need to be appropriate to the lands and waters in which one finds 
oneself. (I mean finding oneself in a place also literally, as one’s sense 
of self develops in response to all the others of the place.) Others might 
find coracles, umiaks, or kayaks better than canoes, or maybe rafts, 
sailboats, even a quffa, or curagh.24 We do not all need to live in the 
same way, but all need to live in ways that are appropriate to where we 
live, and that will not spoil the waters and atmosphere that form the 
larger part of our shared context and global environment. 
Perhaps we are not all in the same boat, so much as in the same 
(figuratively speaking) hot water. Then again, the rich do not feel 
environmental impacts to the same degree as the poor, and research into 
environmental justice and environmental racism indicates that class 
privilege is often also race privilege. Some people have ocean liners 
that dump tonnes of raw sewage in the seas. This is quite different from 
the small craft I am building, but even having the possibility of building 
a recreational boat locates me in a position of privilege. I am sheltered 
by my situation living in the Ottawa valley, as a Canadian citizen, and 
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further as a white Anglophone in ways not experienced by others within 
Canada, let alone beyond its borders. 
My canoe narrative of ethical subjectivity as being with/in is situated, 
and embedded, not only in the more than human world, but also 
culturally. It is provisional, contingent, responsive, and creative. It 
applies to my cultural situation as I perceive it. It is necessarily 
respondent to other narratives of subjectivity, specifically, the Cartesian 
notion of the self as subject, and criticisms of this, including responses 
from modern Jewish philosophers and postmodernists, as well as 
ecofeminists and other environmentalists. There is not much that can be 
said about being, subjectivity, or the self, or what it is to be human, that 
is universal—perhaps only that it is contingent, partial, provisional, 
never finished, never fully thematized. What I say here about 
subjectivity is offered as a particular narrative of being with/in, which I 
hope is ethical. It is intended to be a form of ethical subjectivity, one 
that is more inclusive than models which focus on the thinking self, the 
self as a subject, or even the self as described by the boundary limits of 
one’s body. It is a form of subjectivity as “my life,” described through a 
narrative that includes others, a story told from my perspective, without 
denying that others can also tell stories from their perspectives. 
The subjectivity of being with/in describes being as a verb, tacking 
oneself together as an ongoing process. It is also being through a range, 
mobile subjectivity, belonging to a place without owning it. Being 
with/in is being in relation, not sovereign. It describes belonging 
without ownership of oneself, being without the right to be, as 
provisional (never finished or whole), as constructed (not an essential or 
universal, unchanging entity), as individual (called as oneself, “me,” 
answering the call to ethics), and as interrupted (with/in—interrupted 
by the others one finds oneself with, in context, in situation). The 
subjectivity of being with/in an interrupted conjunction, always in 
context, implicated in the world, always already obligated to others in 
ethics and justice. 
Range and Permeability of Oneself as Being With/in 
The move from the subject-object relations of Cartesian subjectivity to 
the interpersonal relations of ethical subjectivity can be understood as a 
change of perception in terms of domain to range. Subjectivity does not 
have to be a discrete entity as Descartes imagined it to be for it to be a 
meaningful concept. One’s sense of oneself does not need to be as a 
static subject, but should be fluidly stable for mental health. Meaning 
can be perceived without ordering continuous phenomena into discrete 
packages with arbitrarily placed, stratified, solidified, or rigid 
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boundaries. The lack of rigid boundaries does not indicate the loss of 
the concept or thing that was rigidly defined. 
The sovereign self, being at home with itself, perceives itself as the 
sovereign of a domain, fixed with clearly demarcated boundaries. In 
being with/in I perceive myself as the nexus of a variable range, a 
flexible area with differentially permeable boundaries, connected to 
various others in a variety of relations, belonging to various groups, 
such as neighbourhoods, voluntary associations, ecosystems, and 
bioregions. This nexus is not stationary, but moves as my body moves, 
changes as my body changes, regenerating, growing, aging, processing 
matter and experience. Being with/in is a dynamic nexus with a variable 
range, a conjunction that is always interrupted by others. 
Neil Evernden develops an understanding of subjectivity as a field that 
is in some respects similar to my understanding of ethical subjectivity 
as range, building on William Barrett’s interpretation of Heidegger’s 
notion of Dasein as a field of care or concern. Barrett says that “My 
Being is not something that takes place inside my skin . . . my Being, 
rather, is spread over a field or region which is the world of its care and 
concern.”25 Evernden is intrigued by the idea of the self “not 
necessarily defined by the body surface . . . that there is some kind of 
involvement with the realm beyond the skin, and that the self is more a 
sense of self-potency throughout a region than a purely physical 
presence.”26 Barrett demonstrates the awareness of oneself as a field by 
describing how a young child recognizes himself, who can answer to 
his name, but when asked to point to whom the name belongs will point 
to his mother and father as well as himself. Barrett explains: 
before he has reached that stage, he has heard his name as naming a field or region 
of Being with which he is concerned, and to which he responds, whether the call is 
to come to food, to mother, or whatever. And the child is right. His name is not the 
name of an existence that takes place within the envelope of his skin: that is 
merely the awfully abstract social convention that has imposed itself not only on 
his parents but on the history of philosophy. The basic meaning the child’s name 
has for him does not disappear as he grows older; it only becomes covered over by 
the more abstract social convention. He secretly hears his own name called 
whenever he hears any region of Being named with which he is vitally involved.27  
 
Evernden uses this understanding of subjectivity to explain the 
behaviour of people who feel compelled to defend nonhuman nature: 
“Whether it is the housewife who defies the chainsaws to rescue a tree 
that is beyond her property yet part of her abode . . . [or] the naturalist 
who fears the extinction of a creature he has never seen, the 
phenomenon is similar: each has heard his own name called, and reacts 
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to the spectre of impending non-being.”28 In Evernden’s interpretation, 
such environmental defenders’ sense of themselves is not contained by 
their physical bodies, but extends into a field of concern. According to 
Evernden, one identifies with the other in hearing one’s name called in 
this way. 
To a Levinasian, the idea of extending oneself into the world as 
identification might appear to be a totalizing endeavour of being at 
home with itself. It seems to me more ethical to defend places as others, 
rather than as part of oneself, as Evernden and some other deep 
ecologists interpret such environmentalist responses. While Evernden’s 
understanding of oneself as a field of concern does have some 
similarities with my idea of being with/in in terms of range, in 
situations where “each has heard his own name called” in defence of 
places and nonhuman others, I find a more Levinasian approach 
preferable. Perhaps each hears her/his name called not in identification 
with the place or other, but hears her/himself called to responsibility, as 
Levinas describes in the ethics of face-to-face relations. 
Levinas teaches that, in a face-to-face relation, the face of the other is 
exposed, naked. The face of the other calls “the same,” the I, into 
question and creates ethics. The I then recognizes itself as guilty 
“where, qua I, I am not innocent spontaneity but usurper and 
murderer.”29 The face of the other is an epiphany of infinity: it cannot 
be encompassed by the same but instead tears the same out of its 
concern for itself by calling it into question, obliging one in relation, 
electing one to a responsibility one cannot shirk, and in which one 
cannot be replaced.30 This tearing of the self opens it into exteriority, 
beyond being, to ethics. 
Extending one’s identity into groups with which one identifies can 
shade into being at home with itself, since having an identity is 
somewhat tied to being “one’s own,” but groups do overlap, and one’s 
identity does shade into others. In being with/in, I exist in a continuum 
of beings, travelling trails shared with others. Perhaps this can be 
conceived as though I have a number of beginnings, but no specific or 
final endings. When I meet another, we interface, rather than confront 
each other as being mutually exclusive. I begin again at every meeting, 
moving through a range of being. I begin at a spring, where it seeps out 
of granite, through a thin layer of humus amidst tall pines and maples, 
in a hollow in the hills near my parents’ house in the Ottawa Valley. I 
walked there almost daily growing up, where the ground slopes up on 
all sides except for the south, creating a nestled place. To be there feels 
like being gently held in the palm of creation’s hand. It is a place of 
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rest, but also renewal. The spring is irrepressible, a small source of 
infinity. 
The water of the spring trickles down the incline to the south, growing 
stronger as it collects and then rushes as the slope becomes steeper. It 
circulates underground and joins the swamp that sits in the flat that 
extends behind most of the length of the road where my parents live. 
This swamp holds all but a narrow stream of water no more than a few 
feet across that runs behind the land in which my parents live, and feeds 
into a shallow pond my father’s uncle dug for testing the cedar strip 
canoes he built. Now it is home to countless frogs and breeds 
multitudes of mosquitoes. The pond drains through a narrow culvert 
under the dam built by my great uncle, and twists its way along the 
trees around below the edge of the garden. This creek winds a short 
way down, disappears underground again, and flows under the road into 
the York River. 
And so I begin at the river without having ended. Starting in June, my 
brother Chris and I went swimming in the river every day. This 
continued for years, as we paddled up the river with our friends, to see 
the goats, and share lunch across from a clay bank. We explored every 
bend, nook, and depth of the river within an afternoon’s leisurely travel. 
We learned that swans are rather fierce when you meet them eye to eye 
in a canoe, and we grew strong in carrying our canoe up the steep sand 
bank of the river, where our road begins. 
One day there was a sign posted in the park when we went for our 
regular swim. The river is now too polluted for safe swimming. And so 
this became another beginning, of myself as an environmentalist. I 
learned another aspect of being connected: that the lack of adequate 
sewers up river, and on Baptiste Lake, another of the river’s sources, 
fouls the water in the village of Bancroft, and beyond. 
I grew older and for a time lived outside the watershed of my origin. I 
became lost in learning the ways of city living and university methods. I 
learned big words and the thoughts of famous people. My mind 
expanded, yet I seemed to become smaller in leaving my family, the 
spring, the multitudinous connections of home. I did not know that 
place, except to know that it was not home: limestone not granite. The 
water tasted wrong. 
A few years ago, I found myself again within this watershed, on another 
branch that feeds the Ottawa River. I begin again on the Rideau River, 
in the heart of the city of Ottawa, in the neighbourhood called Sandy 
Hill. Here, I have begun a garden. I am rooting. I rent this bit of earth, 
rather than “own” it (as if such a thing were possible), but I do not grow 
only annuals. I am not merely a transient resident. Each year I add more 
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perennials, and we have planted trees. Trees, like rivers and creeks and 
streams, show the branching interconnections, the meetings that sustain 
and renew us, the multiple beginnings that constitute one’s life. 
In being with/in, I understand myself in terms of overlapping ranges of 
various types. I understand myself as being not only, or even primarily, 
here speaking/writing. I am also where I live, with/in the land I live, 
with the others with whom I share that place. The boundaries between 
myself and others, myself and the world are not static. For one thing, I 
am distributed; I am both here and there. Also, my boundaries shift 
depending on with whom I am interacting. In speaking professionally, 
my boundary is not very permeable: I like to have a fair bit of personal 
space, and I usually show only a restricted aspect of myself in public 
venues. 
When I am at home, the boundary between myself and others is more 
obviously multidimensional. I can see a visible map of some of my 
relations in my back yard in winter, when there is snow on the ground. 
My cat Milo’s trail follows the path I make to the composter, and 
continues on past it under the fence into our neighbour’s yard. The 
squirrels’ paths meet and overlap with mine for only about ten feet, 
between the place I leave seeds for them, and the platform for the bird 
seeds. The birds leave footprints all over the yard within about a two-
metre radius of the bird feeder. 
Relationality 
My thinking about the relationality of ethical subjectivity as being 
with/in has been influenced by ecofeminist and deep ecologist’s models 
of the self that emphasize the deconstruction of the boundary between 
self and other as subject and object. The ecological self, as developed in 
deep ecology, tends to speak of the self as coming to identify with the 
world, developing an expanded understanding of Self. Joanna Macy and 
Freya Mathews, for example, each advocate a sense of self that includes 
the natural world not in oppositional terms, but as part of an 
interdependent whole, not separated from nature but continuous with it. 
Macy presents a model of the self as “coextensive with all life on this 
planet.”31 She describes this self as inseparable and continuous with the 
web of life, “interconnected as cells in a larger body.”32 Following deep 
ecologist Arne Naess, she argues that recognizing oneself as being in 
identity with the rest of the world means ethics are unnecessary. “The 
world is our body,”33 so the urge to self preservation protects the larger 
self. 
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Mathews also builds on Naess’ work. In particular, she develops Naess’ 
concept of ecological self-realization in which the self achieves 
identification with “the whole, the ‘world,’” sees “the same” 
everywhere, and is “not alienated from anything.”34 To a Levinasian, 
this sounds too much like being at home with itself, totalizing all into 
one’s own world. The concern of these deep ecologists is to overcome 
alienation from the natural world. Perhaps it would help to describe 
alienation as a state of not understanding or being aware of one’s 
relations to others. To overcome this, one must recognize the relations, 
not merge with the others. For Mathews, and apparently Naess, 
“identification” indicates merging. In Mathews’ and Macy’s models of 
the ecological self, the self is extended into the world to overcome 
alienation from it, so that there is no longer the split of “in here” and 
“out there”—all become one. 
Ecofeminist Marti Kheel criticizes this sort of deep ecology model of 
the “expanded Self” on the basis that it is not gender neutral. The 
ecological self, in her opinion, evidences an expansion of a masculine 
type of self into the world. She argues that the self is constructed 
differently in men and women, due to socialization,35 but also suggests 
that there is an “original self” prior to the ego self36 which is preserved 
in women’s socialization. Kheel argues that a wider identification with 
nature in self-actualization such as Naess advocates does not 
necessarily lead to ethical interaction; for example, there is a tradition 
of men using hunting as a vehicle for self-actualization.37 She also 
criticizes the deep ecological expansion of self for subsuming 
individual concerns.38
I doubt men have any monopoly on egoism, but agree with Kheel that 
socialization is a key to the formation of self. If the self is expanded as 
a domination of ego, it seems unlikely this will solve any of our 
environmental problems.39 Furthermore, as Kheel notes, in ecological 
models of the self following Naess, individual needs do seem to be 
subsumed in the expanded self. If we are all “cells in a larger body,” 
who speaks for the larger body? What happens to the otherness of 
others, and their points of view in this expansion of self? Whose selves 
are we talking about here? What measures are there to ensure that this 
expansion of self is not accomplished as an act of totalization where 
others are simply subsumed? Even if the expansion of self, as Mathews 
indicates, is achieved as a spiritual process of self-actualization, rather 
than through monopolization and domination of an egoistic self, it does 
not seem to recognize actual differences or possible differences in point 
of view. Whose vision of the world is to be realized in the process of 
self-actualization? This model of self does not account for the 
possibility that a Euro-American vision of how the world should be, 
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and actions in defence of that vision, may not correspond to other 
visions of the world, and that there are ethical problems with trying to 
force a Euro-American vision on people in other cultures. 
Ecopsychologist Sarah Conn also builds on Naess’ model of the 
ecological self, but incorporates Arthur Koestler’s idea of “holon,” the 
self as a whole in itself but also part of a larger whole. She recognizes 
possible problems with individual needs being “swept away by the 
larger whole,”40 and recognizes a need for semi-permeable boundaries 
of the self that are neither too rigid nor too diffuse. Feminist Wendy 
Donner, however, cautions against advocating diffuse boundaries in 
relational models of the self. “Distinct selves,” she says, “are necessary 
in situations of care for others, particularly the parent-child 
relationship.”41 Furthermore, she argues, emphasizing relatedness and 
diffuse boundaries in the self does not recognize how these qualities 
contribute to and sustain abusive situations. Donner cautions that 
“Abusive relations are horrifyingly sustainable and horrifying in their 
power to construct, define, and maintain a self’s identity and undermine 
the well-being of that self through the power of the defining and 
abusive relations.”42 Donner thus argues that “autonomy and strongly 
bounded selves are crucially valuable,” noting that this insight is 
necessary to recovery processes.43
Donner focuses her criticisms on Val Plumwoods’ model of the self-in-
relation, because she finds it to be the most promising.44 Plumwood, 
Donner says, is cognizant of deep ecology’s problematic approach of 
“identification,” and thus she “argues for a ‘nonholistic but relational 
account of the self’ which does not deny the ‘independence or 
distinguishability of the other,’ whether the other is another human, the 
community, or nature (Plumwood 1991, 14).”45 Selves, in Plumwood’s 
self-in-relation model, are distinct rather than merged with others, 
whether those others are other individuals, communities, or the cosmos. 
Such selves are not fragmented, and have solid, but permeable 
boundaries. Donner explains that selves in Plumwood’s model “have a 
core unity which holds their parts together . . . They are autonomous 
selves, and so they have the ability to rationally scrutinize their 
different aspects as well as their relations and connections.”46 As 
Donner notes, a self-in-relation must, logically, remain separated from 
others for self and other to be related rather than fused.47
However, while clarifying that the self is fundamentally shaped by its 
relations with others, Donner argues that “the self in the self-in-relation 
is logically, axiologically, and metaphysically prior to its relations.”48 It 
makes sense to think that to be in relation, or to be shaped by anything, 
the self must first exist, but I see no reason to think that the self must 
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first be separated from others in the sense of being independent or 
autonomous. Donner’s concerns about abusive situations are valid, but 
arguing for firmer boundaries does not necessarily solve the problem. 
The problem is not in the self of the one who is abused, but in the 
abuser. The point of those who advocate relational models of the self is 
that if everyone enacted a sense of relatedness, these abusive relations 
would not exist. Of course, changing only one self will not fix the 
system, but neither will maintaining a rigid boundary between self and 
other repair it. 
I do not think Donner and myself are in substantial disagreement. We 
disagree about the formation of self, and to what degree the self is 
“independent” of its relations. To me, it is fairly obvious that in 
physical and psychological terms, the self begins in relation, that being 
in relation is a condition of being, and that the self becomes an 
individual by differentiating itself in relation with a variety of others. I 
think Donner is mistaken to suppose that recognizing the relational 
aspects of the self need impact on the ability of a self to act in its own 
interest, or maintain a healthy sense of oneself. That the self is in 
relation, and builds an ongoing identity in the context of its relations, 
indicates that to remedy an abusive situation, the self must come into a 
healthy environment, relating with others who will not abuse the self. 
Someone who closes herself off from relations in general does not 
thereby heal herself. Healing is facilitated by recognizing that our 
boundaries can be differentially permeable, so that one can set firmer 
boundaries in relations with certain others when necessary. 
Anita Barrows’ work in ecopsychology suggests some useful ways of 
developing a model of the self that is neither too porous, nor too rigid 
for health. Barrows’ description of her variation on the ecological self is 
as permeable, interconnected, and entwined with others. The self 
requires, she says, “enough of a membrane to function,” but the 
membrane must be permeable to interact. Barrows associates the area 
between self and world with D. W. Winnicott’s idea of transitional 
space, as a membrane that “delineates but does not divide us from the 
medium in which we exist.”49 She notes that the process of separation 
in object relations theory might also be seen as coming into a wider 
context of relations beyond the interhuman. Barrows also associates this 
with intersubjectivity and Thich Nhat Hanh’s understanding of 
“interbeing,” which suggests a rich area for further investigation.50 
However, while she gives a sense of embeddedness in the natural 
world, her sense of being within does not lay any stress on the “with” 
part, the relation with specific others as different from oneself. 
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My model of the self as being with/in recognizes the need for a sense of 
oneself as both a unique individual, and as being in relation with others, 
embedded within the more than human world. Similar to Barrow’s 
ecopsychological model of the self, I understand the self as having a 
differentially permeable membrane, and being more or less distinct 
from its environs, depending on the needs of the situation. However, in 
my understanding of ethical subjectivity as being with/in, I recognize 
that the individual is always both with and in, already implicated in the 
world and with others. 
Being Embedded in the World, Being Implicated 
In the embeddedness of being with/in, oneself neither loses one’s 
individuality nor encompasses the world. Oneself is not simply 
embedded in being embodied and being with/in the Earth, Nature, or 
“the environment,” but in a specific place. As bioregional thinkers such 
as Gary Snyder51 and Alan Thein Durning52 argue, to be healthy as 
individuals and as a species within this world, we need a sense of place, 
not Gaia consciousness, but a sense of belonging to “the land” of a 
specific place. “The land” conjures up specific images, a place within 
which one is situated. It is a place where one can find oneself, being 
with/in. For me, “the land” is part of the Canadian Shield in the Ottawa 
Valley: a hilly land of small lakes laced together with swamps and 
rivers, interspersed with granite rock faces, enormous pine trees, and 
the smell of high bush cranberries where partridge live. I do not identify 
with the whole world, expanding my sense of self to contain all the 
Earth, but find myself embedded within a specific place, the Ottawa 
valley. 
To be embedded is to participate intimately in the world: to eat, to 
interact with others, to grow, and to die. In being with/in I am already 
implicated in the world, already guilty. I eat. In being with/in, I live 
through consuming others. In being with/in I am implicated, and 
already obligated with/in the more than human world, embodied and 
embedded in relations with others within the natural world. 
In being with/in, I am a unique nexus, but also always an 
interdependent constituent of larger wholes. This can be imaged 
similarly to J. Baird Callicott’s understanding of nested communities, 
developed out of Mary Midgley’s “mixed community” and Aldo 
Leopold’s “biotic community.”53 In being with/in I belong to my 
family, communities of people and domestic plants and animals, the 
wider biotic community, and the ecosphere. The range of myself 
extends into the groups with/in which I participate, being with/in 
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multiple and frequently overlapping groups, and in relation with the 
other participants in these groups. 
However, in being with/in, I cannot identify with the groups in which I 
participate. I do not acquire a sense of wholeness in being with/in. 
Although in being with/in I belong as an interdependent constituent of 
larger, overlapping wholes, I cannot ethically allow myself to become 
identified with a group to the extent that I feel compelled to defend 
other members because of injury felt to myself. I can speak on behalf of 
other members when I am called upon to do so, not because we are the 
same, but because of our differences. I can ethically speak on behalf of 
others only for them, not for myself. According to Levinas, one does 
not have the right to speak on one’s own behalf, because one does not 
have the right to be, to claim anything for oneself as one’s own, in 
ethical subjectivity. However, this has nothing to do with the others’ 
right to speak on their own behalf—the point is that “I” do not have the 
right to be, “me.” Once another calls me to responsibility, I am 
obligated to the other rather than in possession of the right to be.54  
Being with/in must not become a claim for “my place in the sun,” or my 
place in the world, but instead must be interrupted. Levinas points to 
this phrase, “’my place in the sun,’ that is how the whole usurpation of 
the world began,” from Pascal, in developing his understanding of 
being at home with itself. In claiming “my place in the sun” the self is 
deaf to the cries of others, egoistically wrapped up in itself. Oneself in 
ethical subjectivity, in contrast, is always already interrupted by the 
others. 
Being With/in: An Interrupted Conjunction 
 Being with/in is not the self as a locus, but oneself as a nexus. A 
locus would be one’s own place, being chez soi. Being with/in, as 
Levinas says of the one for the other, is in exile, denucleated. Oneself in 
ethical subjectivity must remain torn open by the others’ questioning of 
oneself. While this nexus does not require a Cartesian subject, it does 
require a core, a point, the moment of oneself tacked together. 
The moment of oneself tacked together bears some similarity to 
Lacan’s understanding of subjectivity in terms of the point de caption. 
Critical ecofeminist theorist Catriona Sandilands explains that for 
Lacan the subject emerges as self aware with a fundamental lack of 
anything to identify with. She writes: 
The subject per se (and not just the ego) emerges with the insertion of the 
individual into the Symbolic order, the gaze of the Other, the totality of signifiers. 
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What is important to note in Lacan is that the Symbolic order is also marked by a 
fundamental lack, a core of representational impossibility; the production of 
meaning is, as a result, permanently contingent, as there is no fixed anchoring 
point to the signifier. The signifier cannot perfectly correspond to the signified; 
instead, meaning is partially and momentarily fixed through a retroactive process 
in which a point de caption (literally, ‘upholstery button’) temporarily halts the 
sliding of meaning of signifiers and signifieds. Thus, the agent is involved in a 
process of trying to compensate for the fundamental lack marking it through the 
construction of a self spoken through these sliding meanings; she or he can never 
completely do so, however, as ‘the subject of the signifier is precisely . . . this 
impossibility of finding a signifier which would be ‘its own.’55
 
In being with/in, oneself as a nexus is a temporary tacking together that 
is interrupted so that it cannot simply identify with itself as “one’s 
own,” or being at home with itself. Oneself is continuously tacked 
together, but always only temporarily so. In being with/in one remains 
oneself although the groups to which one belongs, and alliances which 
one seeks change. There is always something tacked together, although 
the elements change from time to time, from moment to moment.56 In 
being with/in, I am tacked together as my range overlaps with others 
and changes over time, but I cannot simply identify with myself. Being 
with/in is like a canoe, tacked together, oriented to others rather than 
centred on itself, an open vessel that is steered. In being with/in, oneself 
is a nexus point, is meaningful, and is oriented toward others rather than 
self-centred. 
A nexus is a bond, a connection, from nectere nex, meaning “bind.” In 
ethical subjectivity, one is bound, already obligated, already interrupted 
by the others, an interrupted conjunction (with/in). Levinas describes 
something like this in saying that “Subjectivity is a node and a 
denouement—of essence and essences’s other.”57 “Denouement” means 
both resolution and unravelling, the resolution or unravelling of the plot 
of a story or play. “Node” means intersection, as a vertex, a connecting 
point, but is from the same Latin root as “denouement,” nodus, which 
means “knot.” Thus, Levinas is saying that subjectivity is like a knot 
and its untying, but “denouement” is an ending, a closure. The “plot” in 
the denouement of subjectivity is the plot of the other in the same, the 
question and response pattern of thought to which Plato refers: 
The silent coming and going from question to response, with which Plato 
characterized thought, already refers to a plot in which is tied up the node of 
subjectivity, by the other commanding the same. The reference is there even when, 
turned toward being in its manifestation, thought knows itself. Asking oneself and 
questioning oneself does not undo the torsion of the same and the other in 
subjectivity; it refers to it. There is an intrigue of the other in the same which does 
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not amount to an openness of the other to the same. The other to whom the petition 
of the question is addressed does not belong to the intelligible sphere to be 
explored. He stands in proximity.58
 
In the knot and unravelling of ethical subjectivity, the other is in oneself 
as psyche, inspiration, rather than a closed object of thought. The other 
unravels being at home with itself while tying oneself to others in 
relation. 
In saying “subjectivity is a node and a denouement” Levinas is also 
alluding to his idea of the self folded back on itself, “the torsion of the 
same and the other in subjectivity.”59 The self turning back on itself in 
reflection does not undo the knot of subjectivity, knowing as 
unravelling oneself, as understanding. Rather, the self turning back on 
itself is the other commanding oneself. One is not unravelled in a 
conclusive sense that would smooth out the knot, but is at once undone 
and bound. 
Interfaces 
A visiting friend interrupts the writing of this work, and reminds me 
that there are things more important than finishing it by a particular 
date, things more important than philosophy. This essay, like myself, 
remains unfinished—I could edit it indefinitely, but I need to give it out 
to others rather than keeping it for myself. The more I become involved 
in this work, the more I resent interruptions in the writing, but the 
interruptions are necessary, and not just one interruption to break me 
out of my concern for myself and my work, but again and again, to 
remind me of my obligations to others, to live as well as write. 
In the ethical subjectivity of being with/in, I am torn open in being 
interrupted, enabling interfaces with multiple others. Interfaces are 
meetings of oneself in ethical subjectivity with others. In an interface, 
two meet face to face, and each calls a response in the other. As 
Levinas has argued, it is problematic to describe such relations from the 
perspective of an outside observer. In ethics, the relation does not come 
to pass in reciprocal terms, because ethics are what the other inspires in 
me. What I might inspire in the other is unknown, and irrelevant to my 
ethical obligations for and to the other. When I meet another face to 
face, and interface with that other, I can speak only for myself. In 
interfacing, I respond to the specific other before me. That other calls 
up a response in me, never the same as what is called up in me by 
another. 
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My uniqueness is enhanced the greater the number of interfaces of 
which I become aware. In being with/in I am separated from others, but 
without mutual exclusion. The boundaries of the range of myself are 
fluid and differentially permeable. I have a sense of myself as separate, 
but not exclusively so. Self and other are not essentially different, but 
are relationally different. Differences between oneself and others are 
found in relating with others. The more others with whom I am in 
relation, the more differences I find. Relating with a variety of others, 
human and otherwise, allows me to find more dimensions of myself, 
and become a more unique person. Thus I do not lose my individual 
uniqueness in being embedded in a context of relations, as implied in a 
binary understanding of the world.60 Rather, in being with/in I increase 
in complexity through participating in multiple interfaces with others. 
An interface allows two entities of different types to communicate, as a 
point of connection enabling modulation and translation of information 
across a boundary. Donna Haraway61 uses the idea of interfaces in her 
understanding of cyborg subjectivities to demonstrate the connections 
between humans and machines. Cyborgs are ambiguous, and 
transgressive entities, both organic creatures and technological 
machines. In Haraway’s usage, cyborgs are also not necessarily one 
gender or the other. Haraway invokes the image of the cyborg as an 
ironic tactic to disturb gender essentialism in mainstream Western and 
feminist discourses. The image of the cyborg demonstrates and signifies 
the intertwining of technology and organic bodies in humans, and 
undermines the grand narratives of biology, evolution, and technology 
as it problematizes the boundaries between living and technological 
systems.62 The cyborg has the potential to stimulate social change, 
Haraway argues, as an ironic image that suggests a model of the person 
as being connected, responsible, and heterogeneous rather than a 
unitary self-enclosed ego. I might be a cyborg, if my technological 
aspect is my canoe. 
Tacking Together 
Haraway also discusses ethical possibilities of bonding with others 
through making strategic alliances and coalitions based on affinities, 
rather than identification. Affinity is a relation of temporary choice 
rather than unchanging essence. Affinity groups come together as 
strategic alliances in pursuit of specific goals. Within feminism, affinity 
groups enable different women to work together without requiring all to 
accept a unitary identity, even as women or being female. As Haraway 
explains:  
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gender, race, and class cannot provide the basis for belief in “essential” unity. 
There is nothing about being “female” that naturally binds women. There is not 
even such a state as “being” female, itself a highly complex category constructed 
in contested sexual scientific discourses and other social practices.63  
Forming strategic alliances allows women to work together on feminist 
issues despite their differences. Such coalitions also bring together 
people working on environmental, social, and anti-globalization issues. 
Strategic alliances built on affinity allow a temporary tacking together, 
so groups of people are not fragmented but move together with others. 
A strategic alliance is based on a moment, the temporary working 
together of a play of forces around an axis, and builds a momentum of 
alliance through people helping each other. Strategic alliances provide a 
means of preserving ethical relations with others in seeking justice 
more broadly. 
In working toward social change to better include nonhuman others in 
ethical relations, we need not all share the same sense of self. A variety 
of types of craft are suitable for treading the waters and trails in which 
we find ourselves, for structuring ourselves in ethical subjectivity. My 
narrative of being with/in as canoeing is given as a form of ethical 
subjectivity, a way of being in the world that is an ethical dwelling with 
others, including not only human others but all the others in our 
environments and local habitats. I intend that it be non-exclusive, held 
open to the questioning of others. 
References 
 
Abram, David. 1996. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in 
a More-Than-Human World. New York: Vintage Books (Random House). 
Arima, Eugene. 1999. Barkless Barques. In The Canoe in Canadian Cultures, 
edited by John Jennings, Bruce W. Hodgins, and Doreen Small. Toronto: 
Natural Heritage/Natural History Inc. 
Barrows, Anita. 1995. The Ecopsychology of Child Development. In 
Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth Healing the Mind, edited by 
Theodore Roszak, Mary E. Gomes, and Allen D. Kanner. San Francisco: 
Sierra Club Books.  
Buber, Martin. 1970. I and Thou. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons. 
Volume 19, Number 3 25
Callicott, J. Baird. 1989. In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in 
Environmental Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York. 
Conn, Sarah A. 1995. When the Earth Hurts, Who Responds? In 
Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth Healing the Mind,  edited by 
Theodore Roszak, Mary E. Gomes, and Allen D. Kanner. San Francisco: 
Sierra Club Books.  
Davy, Barbara Jane. 2003. The Ethics of Being With/in. Ph.D. thesis, 
Concordia University, Montréal. 
Donner, Wendy. 1997. Self and Community in Environmental Ethics. In 
Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature, edited by Karen J. Warren. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
Durning, Alan Thein. 1996. This Place on Earth: Home and the Practice of 
Permanence. Seattle: Sasquatch Books. 
Evernden, Neil. 1985. The Natural Alien: Humankind and Environment. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Flax, Jane. 1990. Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and 
Postmodernism in the Contemporary West. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Haraway, Donna J. 1991. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of 
Nature. New York: Routledge. 
James, William Closson. 1998. Locations of the Sacred: Essays on Religion, 
Literature, and Canadian Culture. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press. 
Kheel, Marti. 1990. Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology: Reflections on Identity 
and Difference. In Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism, 
edited by Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein. San Francisco: 
Sierra Club Books.  
Levinas, Emmanuel, and Richard Kearney. 1986. Dialogue with Emmanuel 
Levinas. In Face to Face With Levinas, edited by Richard Cohen. New 
York: State University of New York Press.  
Levinas, Emmanuel. 1969. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. 
Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. 
Levinas, Emmanuel. 1985. Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe 
Nemo. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. 
The Trumpeter 26
 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. 1989. Time and the Other. Translated by Richard A. 
Cohen; Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge. Translated by Seán 
Hand; Ethics as First Philosophy. Translated by Seán Hand and Michael 
Temple; and God and Philosophy. Translated by Richard A. Cohen and 
Alphonso Lingis. The Levinas Reader, edited by Seán Hand. Oxford: 
Blackwell.  
Levinas, Emmanuel. 1998. Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. 
Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. 
Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien. 1966. How Natives Think. Translated by Lillian A. Clare. 
New York: Washington Square Press. 
Macy, Joanna. 1989. Awakening to the Ecological Self. In Healing the 
Wounds: The Promise of Ecofeminism, edited by Judith Plant. Toronto: 
Between the Lines.  
Mathews, Freya. 1995. Value in Nature and Meaning in Life. In 
Environmental Ethics, edited by Robert Elliot. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. pp. 142-154 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1967. The Will to Power. Translated by Walter 
Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1974. The Gay Science. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. 
2nd ed. New York: Random House. 
Raffan, James, and Bert Horwood, eds. 1988. Canexus: The Canoe in 
Canadian Culture. Toronto: Betelgeuse Books. 
Raffan, James. 1999. Bark, Skin and Cedar: Exploring the Canoe in Canadian 
Experience. Toronto: Harper Perennial Canada. 
Sandilands, Catriona. 1999. The Good Natured Feminist: Ecofeminism and 
the Quest for Democracy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Snyder, Gary. 1990. The Practice of the Wild. New York: North Point Press. 
Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Volume 19, Number 3 27
Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 The phrase “more than human world” is from David Abram’s The Spell of the 
Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World (1996). It points 
to the way the world extends beyond human beings and human perceptions. There is 
more to the world than human beings, human categories of thought, and human 
perceptions of the world. The more than human world is the natural world inclusive of 
all living entities, including others generally not understood to be alive or part of the 
natural (as opposed to supernatural) world, such as rocks and spirits. 
2 Levinas 1969, 157. 
3 Ibid., 156. 
4 Ibid., 157. 
5 I discuss justice further in my dissertation, The Ethics of Being With/in (Davy 2003), 
from which this essay is drawn. 
6 The idea that there is a single “philosophic understanding of the self” is, of course, 
an overgeneralization that could be easily deconstructed to find a much greater 
diversity of understandings of the self in Western thought, many of them much more 
concerned with ethics than Levinas’ writings about being at home with itself indicate. 
Rather than reading Western philosophy with a hermeneutic of retrieval, as Charles 
Taylor (1989), for example, Levinas, and perhaps most environmentalists, feel it is 
more important to put the Western tradition in question. I have elected to follow 
Levinas’ train of thought here, leaving a broader inquiry into Western writings on the 
self for another project. 
7 Levinas 1989, 173. 
8 In “I-It” relations the self, as subject, reduces the other to an object. Martin Buber 
develops the idea of I-It relations in contrast to I-Thou relations in I and Thou (Buber 
1970). 
9 Levinas 1989, 63. 
10 Ibid., 76. 
11 Ibid., 39. 
12 Levinas 1986, 27. 
13 Flax 1990, 218–219. 
14 Levinas 1989, 182, 184. 
15 Nietzsche 1967, 35. 
16 Levinas 1985, 76. 
17 Nietzsche 1974, 181. 
18 Ibid., 180–181. 
19 Within Levinas’ work, God is necessary for ethics to come to pass. However, God 
is not a foundation for these ethics; ethics are anarchic, without arche or foundation, 
for Levinas. Developing ethics out of Levinas’ work does not then require God as a 
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foundation, and may or may not refer to God. For Levinas, God is the only exit out of 
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